Greater Tigray, and the Mysterious Magnetism of Ethiopia, Haggai Erlich, Oxford Univ. press 2023

I read this important book written by one of the giants of our time over a couple of months ago. I wanted to write a review but it didn’t come through until now. I have been acquainted with his works for over thirty years. The first book I read of Erlich’s was “Struggle Over Eritrea 1962-1978", and later, “Ethiopia And The Challenge Of Independence", followed by "Political Biography of Ras Alula, 1875-1897”.  “The Cross and the River” was published some years after that.  I read these books out of historical interest with some sense of detachment that time and space provided.  His current book Greater Tigray comes after the all-out genocidal war that Abiy Ahmed and the Amhara elite waged on the people of Tigray, so I read this book amid the pain and suffering that Tigrayans on both sides of the Marab River are enduring.   The pain is still fresh and real. I always speculate whether this level of pain inflicted on Tigrayans could have been averted or its magnitude lessened if the Tigrinya-speaking people, (namely Greater Tigray as the title of the book indicates ) were not divided into two segments under two oppressing forces, one foreign and the other local.  Under foreign occupation, the Tigrayans of Eritrea have developed a somewhat different attitude toward themselves and their brothers south of the Marab River. This unique attitude has been instrumental in the current genocide. Probably they are the first group of people to commit genocide against people who are exactly like them. The previously recorded genocides of the 20th and 21st centuries were largely based on dominant assumptions informed by their beliefs of physical or religious differences that the perpetrators held.  For example,  the Turks against Armenians in 1915, the Nazis against the Jews during WWII, the Hutu against the Tutsis in 1994, and finally the Amhara against Tigrayans in November 2020.  For the Tigrayan Eritreans who supported the Amhara project of Tigrayan destruction, there are no perceptible differences to speak of between the victim and the perpetrator.  

Some efforts are underway to bring sense to those in self-denial who serve as purveyors of atrocity within Eritrea and on people south of the Marab River.  In the last two years, I have made a somewhat negligible contribution (as a member of the Campaign for Peace Organization)  to fostering some understanding of the people of Tigray proper and the Tigrayans of Eritrea. So the appearance of this book at this crucial time will help open the eyes of those segments of Tigrayan-Eritreans who leave no stone unturned to show the world that they have no relation to Tigray proper.  It is a fascinating book that one would expect from a man of his stature. 

I was awestruck when  I decided to review this work.   I also asked myself whether I could do justice to his work. In any case, as a proud Tigrayan I feel the responsibility to spread the word that we must learn history to avoid repeating historical errors as the book is trying to show.  George Santayana [add reference] admonishes that those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.  Tigrayans on both sides of the divide have repeatedly failed to remember the past and thus continue to repeat their perennial suffering and humiliation under foreign and local masters. 

                       

Summary

The book contains fourteen chapters, a total of 177 pages excluding notes and indexes. The Oxford University Press published it in May 2023. The territory known as the greater Tigray includes Hamasen, Seraye, Akeleguzay in today’s Eritrea; and Agame, Tigray or Adwa, namely Adwa and Aksum, Shire, Adyabo, Tamben, Enderta, and Wajerat.  This is the cradle of the Ethiopian state that claimed its descent from the Axumite civilization. Erlich asks whether the Tigrayans can claim the Axumite Civilization as theirs.  He got his answer from giant Ethiopianists like Edward Ullendorf and Donald Levine who wrote extensively that the Tigrayans are the direct descendants of this civilization and its legacy of the Ggeez alphabet.  This territory had also served as a ‘gate and wall’.  

The book’s thesis is that the perennial conflict between the dominant Amhara and Tigray is a clash between two different visions for the country.  The Amhara vision is that they strove to create imperial unity around their all-Ethiopian language and centralized political system. One may call it the ‘Amhara thesis’ of Ethiopia, Erlich wrote. The Tigrayan vision, on the other hand, strives to maintain its identity within the Ethiopian nation-state. It has adopted a pluralistic and diverse vision of the Christian kingdom. The difference in these visions has led to a perennial outbreak of violence led by the Ethiopian state against the Tigrayans in particular, but also other regions and ethnic groups.  This is a political culture that became different from the Tigrayans. The latter for example, is illustrated by Emperor Yohannes IV when he enthroned Teklhaimanot of Gojjam as a king to run his local affairs.  He similarly treated Menilik of Shewa. This is a kind of federal system without legislatively laying the framework. Hundred years later, the Tigrayans under the TPLF structured the government in a modern ethnic federal system exemplifying the vision mentioned above.   

It is to be remembered that after the demise of the Aksumite kingdom, the Zagwe dynasty ruled an extensive area between 1137 and 1270 AD. Immediately after that came the Solomonian Restoration centered in Showa.  The Amhara emperors who reigned under this dynasty ruled a wide area to the south and southwest. They spread Christianity in their domain, leaving the Tigrayans autonomous during the centuries. 

 It was Emperor Zera Yakob (1434-68) who established the institution of Bahre Negash and the area of Midri Bahri. Erlich believed the act “can be defined as an official renaissance of a Tigrayan Kingdom ''.   “Bahre Negash Yishaq, a Tigrayan saved Ethiopia twice”, Erlich stated. The first time of course he received the Portuguese soldiers led by Christopher Dagama to repel Ahmed Gragn’s occupation of the Christian kingdom.  By 1535 Gragn controlled the entire country except Midri Bahri. Bahre Negash Yishaq who saved Ethiopia twice finally sided with the Ottoman Turks when he felt his autonomy was threatened and fought against Emperor Serse Dengel and died in 1578. Erlich noted that modern  Eritrean nationalists consider medieval Midri Bahri part of Eritrean history.

During the 16th and 17th centuries, two crucial events affected the Christian kingdom. First is the Oromo migration following the Ahmed Gragn occupation. Second is the increase of the Portuguese influence and subsequent conversion of Emperor Susenyos to Catholicism in 1626. On the emperor’s death in 1632, his son Fasilladas expelled the Portuguese Jesuits. Eventually, he revived the Ethiopian church and established Gondar as his capital.  Not long after the establishment of Gondar as a seat of the empire, history records the rise of Tigray as a practically independent autonomous state due to its economic and social consolidation as well as easy access to firearms in the late 16th and 17th centuries.   Subsequently, Suhul Mikael from Tigray, in the second half of the 18th century, was the king-maker when the Gondarine monarchy weakened. The endless internal fighting in Tigray continued, however. On the death of Suhul Mikael, Ras Woldeselasse of Enderta, with his center at Hintalo, ruled until 1816. According to Erlich, the ‘finest hour' for the Greater Tigray came when Yohannes IV became emperor of Ethiopia.   But his demise in March 1889 ushered in the worst time of its history, in the sense that Marab Milash fell under Italian colonialism and Tigray proper under the cruel treatment of Showan hegemony. However, Tigray’s finest hour under Yohannes included defeating the Egyptian challenge at Gundet and Gura and ensuring the survival of its independence. But the noble from Hazega, Dej Woldemikael Solomon (later Ras) in the Marab Milash rebelled against the emperor and joined the Egyptians in their defeat at Gura (March 1876). The emperor appointed Alula to govern it. Immediately after that Alula moved his capital from Addi Taklai to Asmara, a small village with a population of 150 in 1830.  

Under the sub-title of ‘sad king,’ Erlich wrote that Yohannes’ had no close family member on whom he could depend in times of difficulty since his wife died in 1871 and never remarried even when the clergy and council of elders urged him to do so at the time of his coronation. His only son Ras Araya Selassie also died in June 1888. 

With the death of Yohannes in March 1889, Tigray proper was in complete chaos as the regional dynasties fought each other for power and influence in the absence of a unifying figure of  Yohannes. The hands of Menilik also played a significant role in dividing the Tigrayans.  Famine also played a devastating share in further weakening Tigray. As a result, Medri Bahri fell into Italian colonialism. Italians had held it without firing a single bullet.  Soon enough Menilik signed the Wuchale Treaty in May 1889, in which he agreed to cede parts of the highland plateau to the colonizers.  In November of the same year his coronation as emperor took place.  However, article 17 of the Wuchale Treaty ruptured Menilik’s friendship with the Italians. This brought about the battle of Adwa in which the Ethiopians defeated Italy. The results of the war ended Italian ambitions to colonize the entire country. In the last two decades of the 19th century, Tigray paid dearly to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the empire. But at the end of the century, it became devastated, marginalized, and in one word, ruined. The heir apparent of Yohannes, Mengesha Yohannes, was imprisoned in Ankober, Showa, and died there in 1906. 

The book touches on the Italian aggression of 1935-36 also. It narrated that  the internal division and consequently lack of preparation on the Ethiopian side provided an easy victory for the Italian fascists.  Haile Selassie’s deep suspicion of Seyoum Mengesha, the governor of Western Tigray further undermined the latter’s prestige in Tigray. There were also tactical differences between the emperor and Seyoum who argued that the emperor wanted to sacrifice Tigray when he made the defensive battles to the south of Tigray. In any case, the fascists annexed  Tigray to Eritrea during the five years of occupation.  The British also entertained this policy for a couple of years after the defeat of the Italians. However, Haile Selassie got Tigray back into his clutches. 

Haile Selassie in a space of 18 months, had installed and organized the administration in every part of the country, courts were established and markets were reopened; in a word, tranquility reigned in the country, except in Tigray where the traditional rulers were still in charge. Seyoum returned to govern Tigray with passionate advocacy of the British. But Haile Selassie appointed governors who were loyal to him (Dej. Gebrehiwot, Dej. Abay, etc) and unanswerable to the former. He was made to fail and then lodge accusations of incompetence thereby laying the groundwork for his removal from his position.  This was one of the pillars on which Haile Selassie’s imperial centralism was founded. Eritrea also fell victim to this effort, notwithstanding British efforts of quick politicization of the former Italian colony. Political parties were created (Unionist Party, 1944, Muslim League, 1946, Liberal Progressive Party, LLP, 1948), and trade unions were established. 

Under the author’s Three Revolutions, namely the Derg, EPLF,  and TPLF chapter, he outlines the genesis and growth of these forces. He mentioned Aman Andom’s attempt to settle the Eritrean conflict peacefully. However, the Derg’s intransigence prevented a peaceful resolution. Soon after that, the EPLF showed tremendous growth in numbers and fighting skills. In 1991, the Tigriyans controlled the leadership of Ethiopia like it had enjoyed a hundred years ago under Emperor Yohannes IV. Meles and his group challenged the old Amhara concept of centralism and rebuilt Ethiopia on a federal structure like the days of Yohannes. Meles courageously conceived the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Hagai Erlich stated, “If the GERD fulfills its promise, we may state, it would be a historical turning point comparable to that of the 1896 victory at Adwa”. (p.166) The GERD is a legacy of Meles. Meles was a self-assured Tigrayan, a successor in his eyes to Ras Alula, the man who defeated the Egyptians in battle throughout 1875-84 and had little respect for them. 

 

Under EPRDF Ethiopia began to open up;  on the contrary, Eritrea under Isaias Afeworki has been transformed into a totalitarian state. With the insistence of Isaias, even the Orthodox church was separated from the Ethiopian one. In the past, the churches remained united even under the Fascists and British administration. In 1998 Eritrea began unprovoked military conflict. The war lasted until 2000 and took the lives of thousands from both sides. Amid the war, Isaias ordered a republication of a Tigrigna language book ‘The History of Ras Woldemikael’ by Yishak Yosief, who piled insults on Alula and kind words and hero to Woldemikael. 

A sort of conclusion in what the author entitled “Non-Conclusion” he stated once again Tigray was devastated, starving, and decimated. He calls it a “tragic end to a two millennia story”. He continues to state that the future of Ethiopia and possibly of Eritrea will be shaped once more by the outcome of the Tigrayan drama. Regarding its continuity as a unit, he quoted Colonel R.E. Cheesman, a 1940s British diplomat at Addis Ababa,  who believed that “the crazy structure of the Ethiopian Empire was held together by a mysterious magnetism”. The mysterious magnetism he was referring to seems to be the old royal institution sanctioned by political Christianity,  destroyed by the revolution of 1974-1991, by Colonel Mengistu and the Derg officers.  In the period between 1991 to 2018 dozens of universities were established and trained thousands of young men and women. The country was structured on a federal system and created hope and ethnic self-awareness, which has been exploited in the current crisis. The author notes that “Tigrayans are the flag bearers of decentralism and ethnic federalism. They had their big moments in 1872-89 and 1991-2018”. A minority of tough, strong people, often also fell victim to their divisiveness, endless rivalries, jealousies, and treacheries. 

He argues that a key to a restoration of the all-Ethiopian magnetism is the Renaissance Dam. 

Meles and his people didn’t follow the legacy of Tigray’s old aristocracy. Rather, they were inspired by Ras Alula. Alula to reiterate was (like most of them) a son of a common Tigrayan family (p. 157) () In the days of Yohannes they lost Asmara and Avoided urban development. 

Critical Analysis and Conclusion

1. I begin my critique with Erlich’s characterization of Abiy Ahmed’s war on Tigray as a fratricidal war. Fratricide is the act of killing one’s brother for various reasons, personal rivalry or for other reasons. In the biblical story of Cain and Abel each one of them presented offerings to Ggod.  Cain brought fallen fruit off the ground as an offer, while Abel brought the firstborns of his flock of sheep. According to the Genesis story, Abel's offering is deemed worthy above Cain's, and in a state of anger, Cain killed Abel. This is in a word, fratricide;  where one brother kills another. The word also implies a conflict between two equal forces. 

2. The war unleashed on the people of Tigray,  planned and in a executed coordinated manner by the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF), Eritrean Defense Force (EDF), Amhara Special Force (ASF),  and Fano is a war of genocide as the New Lines Institute recently reported. Among other items, the report concluded: “The killing of Tigrayans; Causing serious bodily or mental harm to Tigrayans; deliberate inflicting on Tigrayans conditions of life calculated to bring about their physical destruction in whole or in part; Deliberately inflicting on imposing measures designed to prevent births among Tigrayans.” There is no doubt in my mind that the author was aware of the atrocity that the perpetrators committed. I cannot imagine why he chose to call it a “fratricidal war”.

3. The author states (p.125) “In the 1950s Tigray had only four high schools…” This is utterly wrong.  I entered high school in September 1962. There was only one high school in the entire region of Tigray. For that reason, I traveled to Mekelle from Adwa where the only high school was located.  The second high school was opened in 1963 at Adwa, one year after I left.  

4. The author again is confusing (p.63) in writing about the meeting of Tigrayan raises Mengesha, Alula, Woldemikael, and Hagos Mircha with the new governor of Eritrea, Gandolfi.  Here is the confusion: there are three Hagoses more or less contemporaries. The first one is Raesi Hagos Engida, who died fighting Alula in January 1897. This is the one who might have been one of the raesis ራእሲ (ታት) who met with Gandolfi in the Marab River on December 6,  1891. The second one,  Hagos Mircha, is the younger brother of Emperor Yohannes IV, who died young, the only title he might have had is ‘Lij’. The third is Dejach Hagos Teferi of Agame, a lieutenant of Ras Sibhat. So to say that Raesi Hagos Mircha attended the meeting with Gandolfi is wrong.  

5. Haggai Erlich confuses the Hagoses again. On p. 66, the author stated on the eve of the battle of Adwa, Raesi Sibhat of Agame deserted the Italians and joined the Ethiopian rank as “did Raesi Hagos Mircha”. This is wrong, it was Dej. Hagos Teferi who deserted the Italians along with Raesi Sibhat and not “Raesi Hagos Mircha”. There was no Raesi Hagos Mircha to begin with. 

6.  On p.17 the author argues that “.....the now marginalized highlands of Hamasen, Saraye, and Akele Guzay developed separately”. On the same page, he offers grits to modern Eritrean nationalists who consider the medieval Midri Bahri as part of Eritrean history.  Haggai Erlich adds to the false narrative the Eritrean nationalists have been peddling for years. The author stated (p.41) that the Marab Milash “remained practically autonomous since the days of Bahre Negash Yishaq”.  The fact of the matter is that Midri Bahri led by the Bahr Negash was first inaugurated by Emperor Zera Yacob who ruled the Christian empire in 1434-1468.  Medri Bahri seems to have gained its fame during Bahr Negash Yishak’s rule of the area.  The latter was native to the general area of Shire or specifically Medebay. So how do those who consider medieval Medri Bahri as part of Eritrean history explain it? 

7.  Moreover, I will go back to Haggai Erlich’s characterization of Hamasen, Saraye, and Akele Guzay,  developed separately. He does not specify when it was. Rather, immediately on the same page, he jumps to Hamasen’s communal rule under the village council between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries (p. 17). According to Manoel Baradas, a Jesuit, who lived at Fremona (between the years 1624 to 1633) now part of the city of Adwa, who left us a valuable book entitled “The Kingdom of Tygre” stated that Tigray  ( Greater Tigray as Erlich describes it) had 24 units known as Negarits, each one was autonomous of each other;  although, the governor of each Negarit was appointed by the Emperor. Moreover, Baradas who lived in the area for nearly ten years long after the death of Bahr Negash Yisak in December 1578 wrote that in “some of these (places) not even the king can name the Xumo (ሹም) someone not native to the area because there are certain families from which he can choose and others from which he cannot: this applies to the most important regions like Syre, Temben, Enderta, Agamea, Seroae”. …”If Xumos were appointed from outside”, Baradas continues to emphasize “ they would not be obeyed but rather rebelled against”. In other areas like Bahr Negash, Ambasnieti, or Nebreid of Aksum, Tigry Mekonen,  the king could appoint whomever he wished. So to state that the Marab Milash “remained practically autonomous since the days of Bahre Negash Yishaq” does not square with the primary source that Manoel Baradas provided. Furthermore, the author’s stance of Marab Milash autonomous development appears to have been influenced by a book, titled Marab Milash, written by an Italian colonial officer in Eritrea, Rufilo Perini ,( published in Florence, 1905). The Italian author argues that  in his opinion there are three main characteristics that made Marab Milash different from the other people in the area. These are: (1) distinct geographical area bordered by the rivers Marab, Belesa and Mai Muna (2) mythology of ethnic identity (3) maintained relationships with the outside world and Europe in particular due to their proximity to the sea (p. 31 of the Tigrigna translation by Vitorio Ronkali, Torino, 1997).  The motive of the colonial officer is understandable.  But, I am not certain why Hagai Erlich pushed the argument that the marginalized highlands of Hamasen, Saraye, and Akeleguzay developed separately (p.22). Furthermore, Perini wrote that the Italians used the tax levy decreed by Emperor Eyasu as a base for their census in 1892. Each village was assigned to pay a certain amount of money. For example, on page 49 of this book Emperor Eyasu who ruled the country in 1729-1753 ordered the villages of ሰላዕ ዳዕሮ and ዓዲ ራእሲ to pay 30 and 15 Maria Teresa dollars respectively.   When Ras Woldeselassie ruled Tigray ( 1780 to 1816) he traveled to Kudo Felassi near modern Mendefera city to collect taxes.   His first inquiry to the people was how much was your tax burden decreed by Emperor Eyasu.  He wanted to collect taxes based on that decree. In light of this truth, what does the separate development that Erlich propagates emanate?  

8. Last but not least, I venture to move from Erlich’s several issues of commission to one of omission. He commences his book with the comment of British intelligence officer, R. Cheesman who wondered about the mysterious magnetism of Ethiopia. In the sense that he was amazed by the “ crazy structure of the Ethiopian Empire”.  That the country was  “ held together by a mysterious magnetism”. According to Erlich the mysterious magnetism that Cheesman referred to that kept the country together is the “institute of emperorship sanctioned by political Christianity (p.178) and the role of the priests in mediating feudal conflicts. However, the imperial institution and the priestly role was destroyed by the 1974-91 revolution.  

9. This being the reality of today’s Ethiopia, bereft of its mysterious formula, Erlich argues that the 6,450 MegaWatt hydro dam that Ethiopia is building on the Blue Nile River, popularly known as the “Renaissance Dam”, is the only hope that might hold the country together. Certainly, economic interdependence is essential to hold a country together. Whether the Renaissance Dam can stitch the country together, only time can tell.  I am not for or against his belief that the dam would replace the mysterious magnetism of ancient times.  But where my focus is going to revolve is if Erlich thinks the dam is significant enough to keep the country together, why did he fail to mention the marginalization of Meles now underway? The man who initiated the entire project of the Renaissance Dam, singularly and solely is rarely mentioned. Furthermore, the author didn’t mention the tragic demise of the chief engineer and the second most important person in the life of the dam. It is also reported that Abiy Ahmed in his attempt to ingratiate with the Egyptians reduced the capacity of the Renaissance Dam. However, this important event is nowhere to be found in his book.